‘Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Implications for land acquisition and population relocation’ by McDowell, C. A.
McDowell, C. A. (2013). ‘Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Implications for land 
acquisition and population relocation’. Development Policy Review, 31(6), pp. 677-695. doi: 
10.1111/dpr.12030 
City Research Online
Original citation: McDowell, C. A. (2013). ‘Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Implications 
for land acquisition and population relocation’. Development Policy Review, 31(6), pp. 677-695. 
doi: 10.1111/dpr.12030 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/4869/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
This article was published in Development Policy Review, 2012, 30 (1): 29-48 
 
Climate change Adaptation and Mitigation: Implications for Land 
Acquisition and Population Relocation 
 
In response to the challenge of climate change developing country governments are 
evolving adaptation and mitigation programmes for which they are seeking 
international financing. This article presents the findings of a review of national 
action programmes and other interventions to assess their likely societal impacts with 
an emphasis on land-use change, future land acquisitions, population displacement 
and resettlement. Evidence presented suggests there is likely to be additional and 
large scale resettlement related to adaptation and mitigation investments in the 
coming decades. It describes such climate change related projects as infrastructure 
development projects and the population displacement they may generate as a form of 
development-created involuntary resettlement. The article considers the policy and 
development challenges such involuntary resettlement will pose and assesses the 
robustness of currentgovernance arrangements to manage that resettlement. It is 
argued that the UNFCCC process presents opportunities for improving the national 
and international management of land acquisition and resettlement particularly in 
LDCs and Small Island States but cautions that at present the financing arrangements 
do not prioritise the legal protection of affected populations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This article reviews national action plans submitted by less developed and developing 
countries as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process 
to secure financing for adaptation and mitigation projects. The aim of the review is to assess 
the likely societal impact with a particular emphasis on implications for land-use change 
requiring land acquisition and population resettlement. It is argued that the types of projects 
proposed envisage mainly infrastructure and biodiversity protection involving what is defined 
by the author as ‘proactive relocation’ (where the purpose is to relocate exposed populations 
from environments at risk to safer locations), ‘responsive relocation’ (of populations from 
environments that are deemed no longer habitable) and ‘planned population resettlement’ 
(where communities are displaced and resettled as a result of the construction of adaptation 
infrastructure and resource protection projects). Having reviewed the types of interventions 
outlined in countries’ programmes of action the article locates such land acquisition and 
resettlement in the wider context of involuntary resettlement arising out of development 
investments, and further considers the strengths and weaknesses of the current governance of 
development-created resettlement at the national and international levels. The article concurs 
with Adger et al.,(2009) and de Sherebinin et al. (2011) that the proposed adaptation and 
mitigation plans and programmes of action, in addition to increasing the number of people 
relocated from areas at risk (Barnett and O’Neill, 2012), will require large scale land-use 
conversions resulting in population resettlement that has the potential to add considerably to 
the estimated 15 million people displaced annually in the developing world by infrastructure 
projects. However, insufficient information has yet been provided by governments on the 
location and likely scale of societal impacts. There is little evidence available to suggest that 
states have considered the magnitude of the additional resettlement challenge that such 
actions will entail, the sufficiency of national laws and policies to manage resettlement, or the 
necessary preparations to ensure that resettlement conforms with the best available 
international standards. It further considers opportunities that are presented by the new 
arrangements for climate change funding for reinvigorating stalled initiatives (by multilateral 
development banks, the United Nations, the African Union, and non-state actors) to improve 
the managment of land acquisition and resettlement and enhance the protection of those 
displaced. Steps towards improvement would include greater transparency in the land 
acquisition and involuntary resettlement process, and the strengthening of the legal rights of 
individuals and communities who lose land and other assets in the development process, 
including the securing of the consent of affected populations to their resettlement. New legal 
instruments ideally would seek to better protect traditional land tenure systems, avoid 
arbitrary displacement, guarantee citizens rights to replacement land, and ensure the payment 
of full and fair compensation based on realistic asset valuation, with fullconsultation taking 
place throughout the land acquisition and resettlement process. 
 
2. Financing Adaptation and Mitigation  
 
The following analysis of the resettlement outcomes of countries’ adaptation and mitigation 
investments is based on a review of key planning and strategy documents produced by 
governments from within the UNFCCC and specifically Copenhagen Accord processes. The 
programmes were subsequently tabled at the COP16 at Cancun, and are now being 
considered as part of the negotiations’ track activities on climate financing agreed at the 
COP17 at Durban . The aim of this review is to gather evidence on the implications of 
countries’ plans in terms of land-use change/conversion, population relocation and 
resettlement, to quantify those impacts, and to assess the policy and legal contexts within 
which such actions will be undertaken in the near future. The review is principally concerned 
with official adaptation1[1] and mitigation plans prepared by developing country governments. 
 
The World Bank (2009) estimates that hundreds of billions of dollars will be required each 
year for several years to enable states to mitigate against and adapt to global climate change. 
There is a complex and ever evolving web of financial support mechanisms to assist 
developing and transition countries in their adaptation and mitigation activities principally 
under the umbrella of the Framework Convention, and including climate specific funds made 
available by international agencies, and numerous bi- and multilateral assistance channels for 
public sector flows, as well as philanthropic undertakings and a multitude of additional 
private sector financial and investment sources. The most significant of these funding 
mechanisms, working both alongside and in partnership with the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and the Climate Investment Fund (CIF) is the Adaptation Fund (AF) which was 
established under the Kyoto Protocol to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes 
in vulnerable developing countries. Other mechanisms include those agreed as part of the 
Cancun Agreement (and further endorsed at Durban) such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) 2[2], 
and the ongoing Fast Start financing provisions.3[3] This range of financial support presents 
major challenges for coherence and monitoring (Corfee-Merlot et al 2009), and also in 
guaranteeing the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord and subsequent decisions and 
agreements (such as the Bali Action Plan) on adaptation.. At the COP17 in Durban the new 
negotiating track (the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP)) was added to the UNFCCC process. The ADP is expected to develop by 2015 a new 
legal instrument on emissions ‘with legal force’4[4] and taking effect from 2020, to secure 
agreement on the operationalising of the GCF, and to manage a work programme to bring 
coherence to the diverse financing arrangements outlined above.  
 
                                                          
1[1] Adaptation refers to planned adaptations that may be either reactive or anticipatory, over various 
timescales, and which are generally undertaken by governments on behalf of society to reduce the 
vulnerability of society to changes in the climate system (Huq et al, 2003:19) .  
2[2]
 Both the SCCF and the LCDF which was used to fund the preparation of the NAMAs and NAPAs, are 
administered through the GEF.  
3[3]
 See www.faststartfinance.org; although India and China are recipients of climate they have confirmed that 
they will not access Fast Start financing. 
4[4]
 Whether ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ is the same as legally binding on all states remains moot.  
As the IIED (Parry et al 2009) has pointed out, progress on climate financing has been slow 
from the outset of the Convention, and it took seven years from the launch of the Adaptation 
Fund in Marrakech in 2001 for an acceptable legal framework for Fund disbursement to be 
agreed. It was during the period of the establishment of the Fund, and in the two years 
immediately before and following the COP15 in Copenhagen, that developing and transition 
states identified in a general, and sometimes in more concrete terms, projects that addressed 
adaptation and mitigation needs within their borders5[5] .  
 
It is these plans that give some guidance on the likely direct and indirect societal impacts of 
adaptation and mitigation programmes particularly in relation to the concerns of this article – 
land-use change and the subsequent involuntary resettlement or relocation of populations as a 
result of policies pursued under the umbrella of adaptation and mitigation. 
 
2.1 National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) 
 
The clearest public presentation of countries’ climate change adaptation planning can be 
found in the National Adaptation Programmes (or Plans) of Action (NAPAs) which were 
produced by more than forty Least Developed Countries (LDCs)6[6] between 2005 and 2009. 
It is relevant to note that the NAPA process was designed to assist governments in the 
development of strategies to enable adaptation projects to be funded and launched. As such 
there was a dual focus among the LDC Expert Group advising governments both on capacity 
building within states, as well as on urgent and immediate adaptation needs, reflecting 
concerns that adaptation to climate change had not yet become a major policy issue or 
priority within developing countries and the ‘mainstreaming’ of adaptation into development 
planning needed to take place alongside improved National Communications (NatComs)7[7] 
on governments’ Convention activities.  
 
                                                          
5[5]
 Transborder thinking on adaptation has been largely at the margins of climate change response planning. 
6[6]
 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are a group of 49 countries considered to be 
theworld’s poorest couŶtries with a per capita Gross Doŵestic Product ;GDPͿ uŶder 
$900 and with very low levels of capital, human and technological development. 
7[7]
 NatComs are periodiod reports to the Conference of Parties (COP) on progress achieved, or activities 
undertaken by governments, in implementing the Framework Convention. 
 
In the preparation of the national adaptation plans governments were unclear about the 
mechanisms for financing, and how any new arrangements may have an impact on existing 
international development finance, including for ongoing projects. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the projects outlined in the NAPAs are generally modest in scale, underdeveloped in 
policy terms, and cautious in the sense that rather than setting a radical new agenda they seek 
build on pre-existing programmes of necessary modernisation and renovation – for example 
the protection of coasts, through the development of new agricultural systems (to adapt to 
salination or water shortage), and restoration and rehabilitation through the replanting of 
coastal forests, mangroves and estuarine marsh, or the preservation of sand dunes. The plans 
contain also frequent references to the extension of insurance cover improved management 
and governance of key sectors, disaster response mechanisms, and also propose projects that 
address the need for improved early warning systems. The NAPAs were more conservative 
than the general press coverage on risks and threats. For example, the governments of those 
countries deemed most at risk of flooding as a result of sea-level rises, and for whom large-
scale displacement and resettlement has been widely discussed in the media, did not prioritise 
the large-scale relocation of populations as an adaptation response. For example, neither 
Bhola Island (in the case of Bangladesh which is popularly regarded as the first large-scale 
example of climate change displacement8[8]) nor international resettlement (in the case of The 
Maldives9[9]) were identified as priorities in the respective NAPA submissions (or indeed in 
the case of The Maldives in follow on national strategies). 
 
Countries Contemplating Land-Use Changes 
 
Forty NAPAs10[10] were surveyed and it was found that they contained statements of intent 
rather than detailed project proposals and as such it is difficult to assess with accuracy the 
                                                          
8[8]
 See Al Jazeera English, ‘Bangladeshis flee disappearing islands’, 17 December 2009. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KF6gEBzJeF8. Accessed on 4 October 2012 
9[9]
 See Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Climate change castaways consider move to Australia’, 4 October 2012. 
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-change-castaways-consider-move-to-australia-
20120106-1pobf.html. Accessed 4 October 2012 
10[10]
 NAPAs surveyed for this article were produced by the governments of Bangladesh, 2005; Benin, 2005; 
Bhutan, 2004; Burkhina Faso, 2006; Burundi, 2007; Cambodia, 2006; Cape Verde, 2007; Central African 
Republic, 2007; Comoros, 2006; DR Congo, 2007; Eritrea, 2007; Ethiopia, 2007; Gambia, 2007; Guinea, 2007; 
Guinea-Bissau, 2006; Haiti, 2007; Kiribati, 2007; Lao PDR, 2009; Lesotho, 2007; Liberia, 2008; Madagascar, 
2008; Malawi, 2006; The Maldives, 2006; Mali, 2007; Mauritania, 2004; Mozambique, 2007; Nepal, 2007; 
Niger, 2006; Rwanda, 2006; Samoa, 2005; Sao Tome and Principe, 2006; Senegal, 2007; Sierra Leone, 2006; 
location, scale and societal implications of adaptation plans in terms of land-use change. 
There are however some exceptions. The Government of Eritrea stated its intention to build a 
multi-purpose large-scale water development project in Genale-Dawa Basin, while 
neighbouring Ethiopia proposed a series of named hydropower projects as did Sao Taome 
and Principal with the construction of hydro-power stations in Claudino Faro and Bernardo 
Faro. The minority of NAPAs (18 out of 40) however, as Table 1 below shows, declared an 
unspecified commitment to adaptation projects that involved land-use change with only 
minimal information provided on the area of land or the numbers of people who may be 
affected by such projects. 
 
Table 1 NAPA Projects Involving Land-Use Change 
 
Project Type Countries 
Coastal reforestation Bangladesh, Cambodia 
Flood protection (sea, lake and dykes) Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Kiribati, The Maldives, Tanzania 
Dams and hydropower Eritrea, Burundi, Lao PDR, Rwanda, Sao 
Taome and Principal 
Inland Reforestation Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Malawi 
Land reclamation Lesotho 
 
Source: NAPAs 
 
Countries Contemplating Resettlement 
 
Evidence gathered from NAPAs broadly suggest that LDCs when faced with environmental 
and climate change sought adaptation solutions that allowedpopulations to remain in situ 
wherever possible. Environmental projects that predated the NAPAs and which involved 
some elements of resettlement, for example, the policy of ‘economic reintstallation’ against 
desertification in Mongolia including pastoral sedentarisation, and the shifting of populations 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Solomon Islands, 2006; Sudan, 2007; Tanzania, 2007; Tuvalu, 2007; Uganda, 2007; Vanuatu, 2005; Zambia, 
2007.  
 
away from the banks of the Mekong river in Vietnam (Warner et al., 2009), were absent from 
those countries NAPAs. The plans suggest that states analysed their immediate situation in 
terms of numerous interconnected problems: population growth, lack of development, poor 
infrastructure, vulnerability to natural disasters and the damage they cause, poverty, 
overcrowding and loss of natural resources and biodiversity; and concluded that solutions 
would require a comprehensive plan of action within which adaptation could be integrated.  
 
Table 2 Proactive, Responsive and Planned Relocation 
 
Resettlement/Relocation 
Type 
Purpose Countries 
Proactive Relocate vulnerable 
populations (towns, villages 
and communities) from 
environments at risk to safer 
location 
Bhutan , Mozambique, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and  
Principe, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Vanuatu 
Responsive Relocate populations from 
environments that are no 
longer habitable 
Kiribati, Comoros, Tuvalu 
Planned Resettlement Resettlement of populations 
displaced by adaptation 
infrastructure and resource 
protection projects 
Burundi, Tanzania, The 
Gambia 
 
Source: NAPAs 
 
As can be seen from the above Table some low lying islands, sub-Sarahan African states and 
Bhutan identified the likely need to resettle populations as part of the adaptation solutions 
either in extremis where land can no longer sustain a population, in response to identified 
risks of flooding and salination, and as a consequence of adaptation projects such as natural 
resource protection and the establishment of wildlife corridors11[11]. 
 
                                                          
11[11]
 A strategy that Geisler and de Sousa (2000) refer to as ‘protected area greenlining’ which involves the 
exclusion of people from conservation areas.  
In most national plans specific details about the precise locations from which people are 
likely to be relocated, to where they may be moved, or the numbers of people involved, were 
not provided. One exception was Bhutan which proposed moving the town of Chamkhar to 
Dekiling, and the Comoros Government which estimated that 10 per cent of its population 
(approximately 60,000 people) would require moving as a result of saline intrusion into the 
groundwater and land. Kiribati recognised that some relocation may take place spontaneously 
in the event of sudden erosion, and The Gambia cited the planned upgrading of the Kotu 
Stream as requiring land acquisition resulting in resettlement. 
 
Resettlement Planning and Policy 
 
As noted above, the Guidelines for the preparation of the NAPAs did not require LDCs to 
provide information on the policy and legal frameworks within which adaptation projects 
would be undertaken. There is no detail for example on legal requirements and policy 
procedures guiding land acquisition or voluntary/involuntary resettlement. Across the 40 
NAPAs reviewed there were only two references to the process of resettlement. The 
Government of Burundi warned that resistance to relocation should be expected, and ‘strong 
legislation (would be) required’. While the Government of The Gambia stated that 
“resettlement and compensation will have to be considered”. The Government of Rwanda 
linked future adaptation actions to its Imidigudu national human settlement policy for 
returned displaced people following the violent conflicts in the 1990s. Against the backdrop 
of concerns voiced about coercion, lack of popular participation, poor design, and small plot 
size the Government of Rwanda stated a committed to this form of concentrated villagisation 
for future ‘environmental resettlement’.The lack of detail and policy consideration in those 
sections of the NAPAs raising the likelihood of relocation and resettlement suggests that 
proper consideration was not given to the land acquisition and the resettlement challenge, and 
associated human rights issues, that will arise were governments to pursue resettlement either 
in a proactive manner (to remove people from areas of risk), in a reactive manner (following 
an emergency or disaster), or as a result of land use changes or the construction of physical 
infrastructure to aid adaptation.  
 
2.2 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)  
 
A further dataset useful in assessing the likelihood of population relocation and resettlement 
in states’ responses to climate change and in their formulation of funding requests are the 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) submitted by Non-Annex 1 Parties to 
the UNFCCC as called for following the Copenhagen Accord. It is generally viewed that the 
process at Copenhagen failed to precisely define what NAMAs should prioritise or how they 
should be included in the international financial architecture for climate change. Similar to 
NAPAs, the NAMAs were mostly generalised and did not set out concrete implementation 
plans, and mitigation was broadly defined. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the 
NAMAs are an important resource because they provide some indication of non-LDC states’ 
thinking and forwardplanning on future actions that have implications for land-use, 
resettlement and migration. Perhaps most significant is the commitment to large-scale 
afforestation (creating new forests) and reafforestation (replanting depleted forests). 
 
Table 3 Afforestation and Reafforestation (Non-Annex 1 Parties, UNFCCC) 
 
Country Commitment 
Togo increase forest cover from present 7% to 
30% by 2050 
Mauritania increase forest cover from present 3.2% 
to 9% by 2050 
China increase forest production by 40 million 
hectares and forest stock by 1.3 billion 
cubic metres by 2020 from 2005 levels 
 
Source: NAMAs 
 
Armenia, Botswana and Jordan each gave a general commitment to reafforestation, while 
Indonesia signalled a policy of carbon sequestration and Benin a programme of carbon 
storage through new plantations. The governments of Ethiopia and Brazil included biofuel 
development and the increased use of biofuels as key mitigation strategies in their 2010 
NAMAs with a focus on liquid biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel).  
 
2.3 BASIC Climate Change Programmes 
 In parallel with the UNFCCC NAPA and NAMA process, fast industrialising states (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China (referred to using the acronym BASIC)) published national 
climate change strategies in 2007 and 2008 which included plans of action, partially cited in 
earlier NAMAs, which also identify and in some cases attempted to quantify new priority 
projects and strategic commitments. As Fransen et al (2009) conclude, these plans articulated 
the potential effects of climate change impacts on livelihood economies, and natural systems, 
but stopped short of providing concrete procedures and strategies for meeting adaptation 
needs. The proposals reflect preliminary adaptation planning efforts but nonetheless provide 
additional important information on likely land conversion, land acquisition and resettlement 
outcomes. 
 
Table 4 BASIC Proposed Adaptation and Mitigation Interventions with Likely 
Resettlement Impacts 
 
Country Strategic Priorities 
India improve coastal protection through infrastructure and 
forest/mangrove restoration 
exploit hydropower potential (large, medium, micro) 
expand forest cover to one-third of country’s area/additional 
afforestation 
Brazil increase rail and water transport/mass transit 
doubling area of forest plantation to 11 million hectares by 2020 
China promote large-scale, water-saving irrigation 
expand forest areas and develop biocorridors 
increase 24 million hectares of grassland  
speed-up water infrastructure including North to South Water 
Diversion project 
 
Source: India (July 2008) National Action Plan on Climate Change; Brazil (December 2008) 
National Plan on Climate Change; China (June 2007) National Climate Change Programme. 
   
In climate negotiations, India and China have consistently stressed the need to avoid 
compromising national economic growth or state sovereignty in addressing the challenge of 
climate change. This is evident in the Chinese Government’s 11th Five Year Plan in which it 
sets out a twin strategy to balance conservation with exploitation, and development with low-
carbon growth. China’s adaptation and mitigation measures, as set out in the plan, have the 
potential to create resettlement on a considerable scale. Most notably in the Priority 
Programmes for Ecological Conservation (Chapter 6, Five Year Plan, April 2010) which 
include: 
  the conversion of cultivated land back to grassland or forest   the conversion of grazing land back to grassland   wetland restoration   and the construction of wildlife and natural reserves  
 
UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) Programme 
 
The UN REDD/REDD+ adaptation involves projects that are part of a range of programmes 
in the broad category of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES)12[12],providing finance to 
mainly forest basin countries to develop low-carbon growth and to help those countries 
access financial and technical support to address deforestation and forest degradation. They 
include also methods and tools for measuring and monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and 
forest carbon flows. The UN recognises that REDD and REDD+ Programme activities may 
impact detrimentally upon the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples or other forest 
dependent communities. For example, , the REDD+ Vietnam Benefit Distribution Study 
includes resettlement as a possible operation linked to an ‘interventions that might address 
drivers of forest change’ (UN REDD, 2010:156). In recognition of the likelihood of 
resettlement, the UNDP (2009) has produced Guidance providing background and context on 
the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in UN programmes and activities, identifying guiding 
principles inorder to respect and support the rights of Indigenous Peoples and other forest 
dependent communities, and outlining the operational guidelines for the design and 
implementation of UN‐REDD Programme activities at the global and national scale. While 
there is no direct reference to resettlement or denial of access to forest land in these 
                                                          
12[12]
 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation has developed a database of PES schemes related 
to agriculture available at: http://www.fao.org/es/esa/PESAL/scheme.html 
guidelines, it is however likely that interventions and activities implemented to avoid 
deforestation and/or forest degradation may include the resettlement of communities from 
those forests, or the denial of access to such resources. It is further recognised that the 
guidelines are insufficient to manage land acquisition and resettlement with the expectation 
that national laws and policies will apply. 
 
3. Displacement, Involuntary Resettlement and Impoverishment 
 
The preceding overview of countries’ climate change adaptation and mitigation plans and 
their participation in other internationally publically funded, nongovernmental or private 
climate change response initiatives, presents evidence that in the coming decades as a result 
of: 
  significant new infrastructure projects (in pursuit of hydropower and water diversion 
and storage, the construction of sea and river defences);  biodiversity enlargement and protection (the creation of new forests, grassland and 
wildlife reserves);   increased biofuel production;  and through the proactive and responsive relocation of communities from land under 
threat of flooding or salination 
 
there is likely to be additional large scale displacement and resettlement of populations in the 
developing world taking place alongside other types of state-managed, spontaneous and 
emergency population movements not directly related to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. Such movements will occur as a result of natural disasters, conflict, state-planned 
resettlement as part of natural resource management or land-use change programmes, and 
resulting from compulsory land acquisition for infrastructure development projects, 
industrialisation and economic growth. Additional land acquisition and displacement will 
arise as a result of the rapid increase in commercial international land acquisitions for food 
and/or energy production, particularly in Africa (see for example HRW, 2012). Furthermore, 
such involuntary displacement and resettlement will unfold in societies where migration, both 
internally and internationally, and in particular rural to urban migration will continue to be a 
significant feature of economic, social and political transformations both spontaneous and 
state-directed, influenced by patterns of national and international investment13[13].  
 
Resettlement that is likely to take place as a consequence of climate change responses 
outlined in adapation and mitigation plans will be managed within the existing normative and 
national and international policy and legal frameworks that shape land acquisition and 
resettlement policy and practice in both the public and the private spheres. Adaptation and 
mitigation interventions, as the review has shown, are likely to take the form of large-scale 
development infrastructure projects and it is therefore instructive, as Ferris (2012) has noted, 
to look again at the literature and research evidence on development-created population 
displacement and resettlement to consider the strengths and weaknesses of current 
governance and resettlement policies, and to further consider whether new climate change 
legislation and the gradual evolution of an international climate change regime, presents an 
opportunity to improve land acquisition andresettlement governance and practice.  
 
3.1 Resettlement in the context of fractured governance 
 
The development-created displacement and involuntary resettlement literature, supported by 
operational evaluations of emergency and longer-term responses by states, international 
organisations and NGOs, points to a strong correlation between the processes of land and 
resource alienation, involuntary resettlement, and the impoverishment and political 
marginalisation of those affected both immediately and over generations (Colson, 1971; 
Scudder, 1991, 1993; McDowell, 1996; Cernea, 2000; Kälin, 2005; Ferris, 2008, 2012; 
McDowell and Morrell, 2010; McDowell and Bennett, 2012; Xi, J. et al 2012 ) . In studies 
that have compared the outcomes of displacement and resettlement across and between the 
displacement domains (where the proximate cause of displacement was either conflict, 
natural disaster, development, or the result of state-mandated relocation schemes) the creation 
of new forms of impoverishment or the deepening of existing impoverishment, and the 
distancing of displaced and resettled people from full participation in society, was a marked 
feature of resettlement undertakings (Ferris, 2008; McDowell and Cernea, 2000). The largest 
and most comprehensive body of evidence of this relationship has emerged out of studies on 
development-created forced displacement and resettlement over the past forty years. 
                                                          
13[13]
 It is estimated that by 2030 there will be 68 Indian cities with populations above 1 million – 18 more than 
in 2010 (McKinsey 2010). 
 It has been estimated that 280-30014[14] million people over the past twenty years (15 million 
people annually 15 [15]) have been displaced and involuntarily resettled as a result of the 
construction of both public and private sector infrastructure development projects (Cernea, 
2008:20). The majority of such displacement and resettlement has taken place in the fast 
industrialising countries of China and India, principally as a result of infrastructure projects in 
the hydropower and transport sector (ADB, 2007).. Without the additional land-use 
conversions generated by climate change responses, the numbers of people displaced by 
infrastructure development projects is set to grow in the coming decades as rates of 
industrialisation inthe South accelerate steeply, population numbers climb, urbanisation 
increases and larger projects consume greater areas of land for power, transport, water, 
commercial agriculture, urban upgrading and industrial zones. 
Over recent decades, academic researchers, civil society organisations representing the 
interests of those affected by development, and indeed the development banks who lend 
money for projects that generate development gains, but in so doing create displacement, 
acknowledge the negative impacts of land acquisition, asset loss and involuntary 
resettlement. Specifically, research across Asia, Africa and Latin America has catalogued the 
multiple impoverishment risks generated by failures in involuntary resettlement and the 
weaknesses in the legal and policy frameworks to protect affected populations against both 
legal and illegal displacement and resettlement (Cernea, 1996, 2008). Loss of livelihoods and 
access to lands strip rural populations of a secure means of subsistence, affecting family well 
being, and social cohesion. When dams impact on downstream river habitats, millions suffer 
the loss of access to aquatic resources, and important sources of nutrition and subsistence not 
only disappear but the costs of substituting such losses in non-monetised or subsistence 
economies can become prohibitive (Scudder, 2006). Such losses typically affect several 
thousand people more than are initially displaced by a reservoir’s construction. Strip 
developments such as new or upgraded highways displace often the poorest people living on 
marginal lands, denying them access to market and customers, and with uncertain title to their 
land, they receive little or no legal protection in the resettlement and compensation process 
(Pearce, 1999).  
 
                                                          
14[14]
 Due to under-reporting and hidden displacement this number is likely to be a significant under-estimation. 
15[15]
 Marking an increase of 5 million people displaced each year when compared to World Bank estimates 
produced in the mid-1990s. 
While economic losses are significant in resettlement, community disarticulation is arguably 
the most complex impoverishment risk in the displacement and reconstruction process. The 
term is used to refer to the tearing apart of social structures, interpersonal ties, and the 
enveloping social fabric as a result of forced resettlement. Cernea and McDowell (2000) have 
described the main elements of community disarticulation as the scattering of kinship groups 
and informal networks of mutual help. The unravelling of spatially and culturally based 
patterns of self-organisation, social interaction and reciprocity represents loss of valuable 
social capital that compounds the loss of both natural and man-made capital (Downing 1996; 
McDowell and Bennett, 2012). While these components of impoverishment were identified 
in relation to involuntary resettlement induced by planned development processes, the same 
risks – though in different combinations, and with different intensities – will be critical in 
other domains of forced displacement including the infrastructure and biodiversity protection 
projects proposed in the NAPAs and NAMAs.  
 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement call for ‘large-scale’ development-
induced displacement only to be undertaken if there is a ‘compelling’ and overriding public 
interest, when all other options have been exhausted, and where those affected have given 
their consent to acquisition and resettlement. However, as governments are faced with limited 
public funds to meet the demands of infrastructure development the line between public 
interest and ‘for profit’ private development is increasingly blurred. Purchase by the private 
sector is risky to land based rural farmers who, once divested of their land-based livelihoods, 
have few skills with which to turn cash compensation into sustainable livelihoods. The extent 
of private engagement in adaptation and mitigationis not yet clear, but states are likely to 
follow the dominant development financing model to include large-scale public-private 
arrangements with market mechanisms.16[16]  
 
New forms of particularly pernicious impoverishment occurring as a result of involuntary 
resettlement have been identified where political disempowerment coupled with 
marginalisation - both within displaced communities and between the displaced and the wider 
society and the state – is creating new vulnerabilities leading to social unrest (McDowell and 
Bennett, 2012). Pieke has described how ‘land acquisition is the most important source of 
discontent and exploitation in rural China (personal correspondence) (see also Amnesty 
                                                          
16[16]
 Such mechanisms have been widely discussed by the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Climate 
Finance but without clear consensus. 
International, 2012).17[17] In India, increasing social unrest or the fear of unrest prompted the 
Government of India to approve for the first time a Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy in 
2007, focusing on both public and private sector investments. The adoption of the policy was 
an indication of the importance of this issue to one of the world’s major economies. Given 
such unrest, governments undertaking additional land acquisition involving population 
resettlement as part of their adaptation response face a considerable challenge in persuading 
populations that the proposed actions and the societal and political costs they entail are 
justified by the threat of climate change; without public support the risks of unrest will 
multiply. 
 
Evidence shows that tribal and indigenous populations, and those urban dwellers unable to 
prove ownership of the lands they occupy or depend upon for subsistence are particularly 
vulnerable to marginalisation and impoverishment in land and resource alienation, and 
historically such populations have been at greater risk of summary eviction in the 
development process (McDowell and Bennett, 2012). Adaptation and mitigation projects will 
add to the growing and immediate challenge of managing the development process while 
protecting the rights of citizens in situations of displacement and land acquisition. A 
challenge currently exacerbated by five main drivers: 
  inadequate available unoccupied public land for development purposes;   increased forced acquisition of both private lands and public lands occupied by the 
landless;   the non-availability of alternative land for replacement to ensure those who lose their 
lands todevelopment are able to regain sustainable livelihoods;   increasing private sector investments with minimal regulatory oversight by the state;   and finally, a rise in public private investments with state involvement in 
expropriation but where investments are profit-oriented rather than in the public 
interest.  
The protection afforded to those who are most vulnerable to such pressures on development 
remain weak, in large part because the land tenure rights of individuals and communities are 
                                                          
17[17]
 The absence of a land market in China coupled with the absence of legal provision to limit expropriation 
for public purpose development, has resulted in farmers losing their land to unscrupulous local governments and 
private developers who work in tandem investing in developments including golf courses, property development 
and special economic zones. 
themselves far weaker than eminent domain laws. Important efforts have been made at the 
international level, led by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to respect 
and strengthen land tenure systems, and these have been further endorsed by the UNDP 
Initiative on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEAP), and noted in successive World 
Development Reports. In addition the World Bank has increased its investments in land-
tenure related projects, and NGOs have published numerous policy statements urging the 
strengthening of land tenure. However, as pressure on land grows, the rules, norms and 
institutions that govern access to and control over traditional lands are being placed under 
immense strain, not least when eminent domain rights are employed to expropriate land.  
 
Further policy developments over the past decade have sought to improve the response to 
development-forced displacement and to provide more effective safeguards for those most 
negatively affected. In addition to the Government of India, other countries such as Vietnam 
China, Sri Lanka, Lao PDR have adopted national resettlement policies and laws since 2005, 
and in acknowledging past damage (as the Chinese have recently done in paying reparations 
to some of the 23 million people displaced by dams in that country since 1949), governments 
more so today than in the past are prepared to accept that development and economic 
progress cannot easily be achieved by disenfranchising and leaving behind populations who 
by happenstance live in the path of ‘progress’.  
 
Within the main lenders, most notably the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), there were strong pressures from staff within those institutions, and also from NGOs 
on the outside, to strengthen their safeguard policies to ensure that development funded in 
part or whole by Bank loans did not have the perverse counter development impacts of 
increased impoverishment, marginalisation of indigenous population and women, and 
accelerated damage to the environment. Consequently, throughout the 1990s there was 
encouraging dialogue between the development banks and lender governments on new policy 
and legislative frameworks within which land acquisition and involuntary resettlement would 
be conducted.18[18] There was encouragement also that the banks’ oversight role was being 
strengthened.19[19] However, in recent years, and reflecting a weakening of the development 
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 The ADB in particular used its resources to fund technical assistance programmes designed to bring polices 
and laws in line with the best international standards. 
 
19[19]
 For example, the Mumbai Urban Transportation Project (MUTP) funded by the World Bank and which 
displaced some 12,000 people, failed to plan for commercial opportunities for displaced small businesses and 
banks’ safeguards regime generally, the development banks would appear to have 
backtracked from this commitment to international standard setting and the momentum 
gained towards improving legislative frameworks for resettlement has been lost. However, 
accountability mechanisms, such as the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, continue to play an 
important scrutiny role in response to complaints from ordinary citizens who feel they have 
been adversely affected by development bank investments in projects that generate 
resettlement. 
 
Soft law instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 
recognising arbitrary displacement in the development process as a potential source of human 
rights violations, set out the responsibilities of states in avoiding displacement where ‘large-
scale’ projects could not be shown to be in the national interest, and in providing assistance 
and protection to displaced people eventually enabling their return. While the Principles will 
not be accepted as new binding international law, elements of the Principles have been 
incorporated into the domestic legislation of some developing countries, and they influenced 
the drafting and adoption of the Africa Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced People in Africa (Kampala Convention) in October 2009, which also 
seeks the enhanced protection of development-displacees on the African continent.  
 
Despite these normative and legal gains, and additional technical improvements in calculating 
and making reparations for assets lost as a result of land acquisition, impoverishment remains 
the dominant outcome for the majority displaced from their lands and communities as a result 
of development investments. There are a range of new uncertainties in the coming decades 
that present even greater challenges for policy makers, civil society, academic researchers 
and the affected populations. These include: 
  the fast evolving shift towards commercial development for example in highways and 
energy development, in the construction of dams for power generation;   with conflict related internal displacement on the increase (see IDMC 2011 Global 
Report) it is more commonly the case that development-forced displacement is inter-
meshing with conflict population displacement - this dynamic has clear protection 
implications;  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was finally suspended after the Bank’s Board approved the inspection panel’s critical report. The suspension 
was lifted after the approval of a remedial action plan. 
 similarly, disaster-related displacement is on the rise (ICRC World Disasters Report 
2011) and again there is a dangerous intersection of types of displacement thatraise 
complex response and protection challenges;   and the rise of new investors, such as China in Africa and the Mekong Region, raises 
potential social risks that are only now being documented (HRW, 2012).  
 
Development displacees in unstable and particularly undemocratic countries in conflict are 
particularly susceptible to human rights violations and multiple displacement in this new 
development context.  
 
4 Resettlement performance and convention reporting 
 
Complex negotiations in an attempt to secure political agreement on the continuation of the 
Kyoto Protocol (so called KP II)20[20], on Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
requirements, and towards resolving disagreements on the issue of a globally binding rather 
than domestically binding targets on C02 emissions are currently underway in the transition 
period between COP17 in Durban and 2020 (by when the new regime including a binding 
agreement to reduce emissions is scheduled to be in place). While significant funding pledges 
have previously been made to support NAPA and NAMA projects, it is unclear how many of 
the projects identified by governments are likely to go ahead while negotiations continue and 
while political will for an agreement remains weak. However, Fast Start concessional loans 
and grants distributed through multilateral channels such as the GEF under the Trusteeship of 
the World Bank, and the CIF managed by a group of multilateral development banks, remain 
the most immediate and accessible source of financing for NAMA and NAPA projects. While 
initial pledges of $30 billion between 2010-2012 have not been realised21[21], and there is 
limited transparency on the commitment and disbursement of monies from many donors, 
Europe, the US and Japan continue to push for financing through this mechanism to enable 
LDC and Small Island States (SIS) to begin work on their NAMA and NAPA projects.  
 
Fast Start financing is important to certain western governments as a means of rebuilding 
confidence and trust between developed and developing countries in the continuing absence 
                                                          
20[20]
 Following Canada’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 it is likely that a second 
commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol will include only EU member states. 
21[21]
 Barely half of this amount is likely to be committed (see Nakhooda et.al. 2011). 
of any clear consensus on a more general framework for climate financing. Despite the 
flagging momentum behind Fast Start it presents both opportunities and risks for any 
ambition to use climate change adaptation and mitigation processes as leverage to tackle the 
weaknesses in national and international frameworks for managing land acquisition and 
population resettlement in the development context. Fast Start financing, by its nature, carries 
the risk that projects may proceed without the full and necessary scrutiny of legal and policy 
measures to fully protect against land acquisition and resettlement that is poorly managed, 
underfunded or purely speculative. The channelling of Fast Start funds through the World 
Bank administered GEF provides both a risk and an opportunity. On the one hand, there is 
concern that the World Bank’s Country Systems Approach, in which the implementation of 
bank-financed projects increasingly relies on borrower governments’ institutions, laws and 
policies rather than on the Bank’s own environmental and social safeguard policies to ensure 
that people and the environment are not harmed in the development process , marks a further 
retreat on the part of the Bank towards setting and upholding international standards on 
resettlement and protecting the most vulnerable. Balasundaram and Dobinger acknowledge 
that the adoption of country systems by the institutional members of the GEF has important 
implications for the projects it funds and ultimately ‘might affect the effectiveness of such 
safeguards’ (2006:12). On the other hand, the high-level ministerial engagement in the Fast 
Start and GEF, which includes the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Climate 
Finance and numerous bilateral talks, represents an opportunity to position the social impacts 
of any decisions taken on climate financing to be at the centre of those discussions. For some 
years, western governments and UN agencies (including UNHCR and UNDP) have shown a 
reluctance to engage with developing country governments at any senior political level on 
involuntary resettlement, however, the current political momentum and the broad nature of 
the discussions around energy policy, urbanisation, and biodiversity protection offer an 
opportunity for such engagement to take place on a constructive basis where adaptation and 
mitigation projects are not stand alone but are rather fully integrated into national 
development planning and international cooperation. 
 
It was agreed at Cancun that Parties would report annually on the delivery of their 
commitments to Fast Start and formal reporting to the UNFCC therefore is continuing 
through National Communications (NatComs) with states establishing new institutions for 
this purpose. The main objective of reporting is to track progress made by governments on 
carbon emission reductions, to provide international recognition of progress, to introduce 
transparency in the use of funds, and ultimately to add credibility to the UNFCC process 
itself. Overall the reporting regime is not particularly strong. NatComs are sporadic, not 
subject to expert review, and their quality varies greatly depending on the sufficiency of data 
and the resources and capacity within governments to undertake complex evaluations. 
However, it is argued here that within NatComs, and eventually through domestic MRV, 
there are opportunities to build in the requirement that states in receipt of international 
financing for projects that involve land acquisition and resettlement provide full and 
comprehensive reporting on resettlement’s legal basis, detailing the policies that guide 
consultation and compensation, and provide evidence of how any resettlement is to be 
undertaken and its predicted impact on those affected made clear.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that in any analysis of green adaptation and mitigation that involves 
land-use change and resettlement it is important to understand such processes within the 
international and national complex of population movements including historical internal 
displacement and resettlement. Climate change related resettlement will not occur in a 
vacuum but rather will be shaped by other types of conflict and non-conflict related 
movement within a country and across borders. The complexity of such movements of people 
presents protection challenges of equal complexity that will need to be addressed by states 
and their funders contemplating any new land acquisitions or land-use change that demands 
population relocation.  
 
It has been further argued that such resettlement will take place against the backdrop of what 
has been described above as the fractured governance of population displacement and 
resettlement, and poor performance in the public and private development process. 
Information advanced by governments on their national actions plans to tackle climate 
change, as we have seen, provide insufficient information on the location and likely scale of 
these societal impacts. Many states do not have land acquisition or resettlement legislation 
that is adequate to guarantee the protection of the displaced or to ensure their rehabilitation in 
a new location. Little evidence has been advanced to suggest that either donors or the 
recipient states of climate financing have considered the magnitude of the additional 
resettlement challenge or the sufficiency of international and national laws, operational 
guidelines and policies to manage resettlement in a manner that conforms with the best 
available international standards.  
 
The past three decade has seen what Weiss and Korn (2006) have described as ‘bottom up’, 
soft law and normative attempts (i.e. World Bank’s safeguard policies, UN Guiding 
Principles, voluntary business codes on social protection) at formulating a regime that 
strengthens the legal and policy frameworks within which land acquisition and involuntary 
resettlement take place. The UN’s humanitarian reform process which began in 2005 and was 
designed to identify and fill gaps in humanitarian protection, involved serious discussions 
among UN agencies and NGOs about the status of development displaced persons as 
potentially a ‘people in need’ of humanitarian protection and warranting a humanitarian 
response. While the UNHCR has stretched its mandate to include the responsibility to protect 
not only international refugees but also those who have not crossed a border but who 
nonetheless are in a refugee like situation, the refugee agency along with other humanitarian 
actors has repeatedly balked at expanding the definition of displacement to include those 
people who lose their homes and their assets in the development process. Martin (2004, 2010) 
believes there are arguments in favour of formalising this process and that development-
induced population displacement can be considered a form of forced migration and as such 
could arguably fall under the remit of a newly constituted UN agency (a High Commission 
for Forced Migration) charged with enforcing a new binding convention on the rights of all 
displaced persons (internal and international, conflict and non-conflict) to include those 
displaced and relocated as a consequence of climate change. To date, however, it would seem 
that land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, unless those displaced people find 
themselves mixed with more traditional refugees fleeing conflict and whose rights are clearly 
being violated, will not be considered as warrantinghumanitarian protection.  
 
This position is understandable because the humanitarian world faces a significant challenge 
dealing with the world’s conflict and natural disaster displaced, often struggling to finance 
their operations and with an ever present concern that states in both the developed and 
developing world are questioning the relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention and may 
seek revisions which would reduce their legal obligations to protection and asylum. There is a 
danger that the sheer number of development displacees would eclipse the number of cross-
border refugees and IDPs in situations of conflict and divert resources, and the inclusion of 
those displaced as a result of climate change adaptation and mitigation projects, in the count 
of the globally displaced would further broaden the definition of displacement, confuse 
public understanding and ultimately reduce public sympathy for conflict refugees.  
 
It is therefore unlikely that the humanitarian agencies, headed by the UNHCR, will, as Martin 
has urged, take a leading protection role in displacement where climate change and climate 
variability are the most immediate causes. However, the attention drawn to the human 
consequences of climate change, including displacement and resettlement that is either 
planned or spontaneous, through the arguments and case studies presented by UNHCR (see 
Ferris, 2012), discussed at high level humanitarian fora, and argued in civil society advocacy 
campaigns, has ensured that protection is an issue of concern to the international politics of 
climate change, and this is raising the potential for persuasion to change perceptions and 
behaviour among governments who are responsible for managing adaptation.  
 
As Betts (2009) has argued, for persuasion of this kind to work, there needs to be a structural 
and institutional basis and context within which ideas and evidence can inform behaviour. 
The negotiations track established at Durban, alongside Fast Start financing discussions, and 
further detailed negotiations on MRVs and the form of reporting required from NatComs 
involves a dense array of meetings among the Convention parties that presents opportunities 
for governments, international organisations or nonstate actors to influence policy decisions. 
Persuasion, as Betts notes, is more likely to be successful in achieving its objectives where 
there is an interconnection between issue areas allowing for cross-issue persuasion 
(2009:188-189) and where decisions taken can be seen to advance the interests of developing 
states. This article tentatively suggests that Convention negotiations have the potential to 
influence states understanding of resettlement, specifically in arguing that well-managed 
resettlement that respects human rights and involves proper investments in livelihood 
rebuilding has the potential to reduce the likelihood of opposition and unrest to large projects, 
which in turn could limit future irregular migration, and buttress public support for climate 
change policies. Outcomes that would be favourable to all Parties. 
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